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COMES NOW the Appellant, Patrick Glen Hamilton,

and through his attorney ofrecord,

CHARLES M. STROSCHEI N of the law firm of Clark and Feeney, and responds to the State's brief

III.
ARGUMENT

A.
THE SOPS ARE VOID AND TIIEREFORE THE BREA TH TEST
RESULTS CANNOT BE USED TO SUPPORT A LICENSE SUSPENSION
The State in its Respondenf s Brief states: "The Administrative Procedures Act permits the
Idaho State Police to adopt a temporary rule effective upon its publication in the Idaho
Administrative Bulletin, I.C. § 67-5226. The Governor's finding clearly justifies ISP's temporary
rulemaking." Respondent's Brief at p. 16. Mr. Litteneker attached to his Respondent's Brief a copy
of the section Idaho Administrative Bulletin that sets out the temporary rule. That Administrative
Bulletin is dated October 1, 2014. Based on the State's argument, the ID APA rules regarding breath
testing would have been effective on October 1, 2014, not on September 7, 2014.
Idaho Code§ 67-5226(1) states: "(l) If the governor finds that: (a) Protection ofthe public
health, safety, or welfare; ... ". There is nothing in this record that indicates that the Governor made
any findings that justifies ISP' s temporary rulemaking. The language from the legislature is quite
clear that the Governor has to make a finding that the temporary rulemaking is justified. Based on
Mr. Litteneker's argument, the temporary rule would not have been effective until October 1, 2014,
,vhich doesn't justify the finding made by the hearing officer in Mr. Hamilton's case. The State, in
its briefing, does not cite to the hearing officer's specific finding. The hearing officer noted:

"4. \VAS THE EVIDENTIARY TEST PERFORM ED IN COMPLIANCE
WITH ALL REQUIREMENTS SET FORTH IN IDAHO CODE AND ISPFS
SOP? 1. Senior Trooper Talbott's sworn statement states the evidentiary test was
performed in compliance with Idaho Code andISPFS SOP. 2. Hamilton's evidentiary
test was performed in compliance with Idaho Code and ISPFS SOP.
Findings and Conclusion s, p. 6, Exhibit to Clerk's Record, p. 363
The hearing officer goes on to note:

5. DID THE EVIDENTIARY TESTING INSTRUM ENT FUNCTION
PROPERLY WHEN THE TEST \VAS ADMINISTERED? ... 2. The valid
performane e verifieation check approved the instrument for evidentiary testing in
accordance with ISPFS SOP.
Findings and Conclusion s, p. 6, Exhibit to Clerk's Record, p. 363
The arresting officer's declaration states as follows:
"Defendan t \Vas tested for alcohol concentrati on, drugs, or other intoxicating
substances. The test(s) was/were performed in compliance with Section 18-8003 &
18-8004(4 ), Idaho Code, and the standards and methods adopted by the Departmen t
of Law Enforceme nt."
Exhibit to Clerk's Record, p. 6
The Departmen t of Lmv Enforceme nt did not exist in September 2014. The Trooper cited
to standards and methods that haven't been in existence for several years. There may be an argument
that the Departmen t of Law Enforceme nt is now ISP Forensic Services but why doesn't the
Declaration cite to ISP Forensic Services. The Declaration is specific to the standards and methods
adopted by the Departmen t of Law Enforcement. The hearing officer was very specific in his
findings that he used ISP Forensic Services' SOP; not administrat ive rules. In Hern v. State
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c~l

Court

Appeals, Docket

Opinion

87 (Ct.

App. 2015) and Ewing v. State of Idaho, Department of Transportation, Docket No. 42599,
Unpublished Opinion No. 777 (Ct. App. 2015), the Court of Appeals determined the SOPs were
void. Clearly, rulemaking did not take effect until after Mr. Hamilton's breath test, therefore, the
application of Hern and Ewing, to Mr. Hamilton's case is appropriate. See also State v. Haynes, 159
Idaho 36,355 P.3d 1266 (2015), State v. Riendeau, 159 Idaho 52,355 P.3d 1282 (2015), State v.

l'{auert, Kootenai County Case No. CR 2013-10176, Supreme Court. No. 0042441-2014 (dismissed
upon motion of the State). Mr. Hamilton's initial briefing vvas submitted to the Court prior to the
decisions issued by the Court of Appeals in Hern and Ewing.
The hearing officer, in Mr. Hamilton's case, did comment on the argument regarding IDAP A
rulemaking and simply noted that: "On September

2014, ISP Forensic Services adopted the SOP

into the IDAPA rules:' The hearing officer then cites to websites. ISP Forensic Services did not
"adopt the SOP" into the administrative rules. The SOP is void. Based on the Attorney General's
statement in his brief~ the ID APA rules did not become effective until October

L 2014.

However,

there is no evidence in this record of compliance with I.C. § 67-5226(1 ). The Governor did not
making a finding.
As this Court is avvare, the arresting trooper avoided being subpoenaed so he could not be
questioned regarding his outdated Declaration and his knowledge of any nevvly drafted ID APA rules.
Common sense vvould probably dictate that Trooper Talbott would not have had any knovvledge of

3

IDAPA

breath testing

the State

Idaho

nothing was published

October 1, 2014.
At no time, during the hearing on October 1, 2014, did hearing officer Eric Moody, note for
the record that he ,vas considering any IDAPA Rules regarding breath testing. He does say that he
is going to take judicial notice of the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act, the Idaho State Police
Forensic Website, relevant city or county ordinances, Idaho statutes, Court decisions and the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Manual for field sobriety testing. Counsel had
previously filed an objection to judicial type notice. Exhibit to Clerk's Record, p. 39, Tr., pp. 7-8.
The District Court in Mr. tiamilton's case used his decision regarding the SOPs from Hern
v. ITD to justify his Hamilton decision. As this Court is aware, Judge Brudie's decision in Hern v.
JTD was overturned on December 30, 2015. The District Court's analysis was wrong on the issue
of the SOPs. The SOPs are void and not a basis for breath testing. The hearing officer used the
SOPs for his finding proper breath testing.
Mr. Hamilton has met his burden, as did Mr. Hem and Mr. Ewing, regarding the argument
of the SOPs. The State noted: "Mr. Hamilton offers nothing more than the same unsubstantiated
argument consistently rejected by the Court." Respondent's Brief, p. 17. This is the same sort of
argument the State made \vith regard to Mr. Ewing and Mr. Hem's cases. The argument regarding
the SOPs ,vas "substantiated" in Hern and Ewing and Mr. Hamilton has met his burden pursuant to
I.C. § l 8-8002A(7)(d). Therefore, the Court must determination that the breath test does not support
the license suspension.
4

B.
THERE WAS NO LEGAL CAUSE TO STOP MR. HAMILTON'S
MOTOR VEHICLE PURSUANT TO I.C. § 18-8002A(7)(a)

The State's Brief fails to take into account the fact that J.C.§ 49-456(1) must be construed
\Vith the rest of the provisions in the chapter dealing with registration. "Language of a particular
section need not be vie\ved in a vacuum. And all sections of applicable statutes must be construed
together so as to determine the legislature's intent." Lockhart v. Dep 't ofFish and Game, 121 Idaho
894,897,828 P.2d 1299, 1302 (1992)". State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 439,362 P.3d 514 (2015). The
District Judge in Hamilton did not discuss or construe I.C. § 49-456(1 ). The State simply says the
statute doesn't apply but doesn't explain why LC.§ 49-456(1) doesn't apply. Again, let's be clear,
Mr. Hamilton did not have an improper registration sticker as was determined by the hearing officer.
The hearing officer said: "J.C. § 49-428(2) clearly notes a vehicle is not properly registered if the
registration sticker is not located on the license plate as set forth in I.C. § 49-443(4)." I.C. §49428(2) does not "clearly"' note that a vehicle is "not properly registered" if the registration sticker is
outside the rectangle box. This finding is not the reason Mr. IIamilton was pulled over.

Mr.

Hamilton vvas pulled over because the registration sticker was not in the rectangle box. The hearing
officer's decision is based on an improper registration or improper registration sticker, which is not
found on this record. The only thing that is found on this record is the fact that the registration
sticker was not in the rectangle box. Findings and Conclusion, pp. 4-5, Exhibit to Clerk's Record,
pp. 361-362.
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Idaho Code§ 49-456 and I.LR. 9(b)(1

are applicable to the analysis in this case. Of course

the State ignores I.LR. 9(b )(16) ·which states:
Operating vehicle without registration. Section 49-456( 1), Idaho Code. (Fixed
penalty $44.50, court costs $16.50, county justice fund fee $5.00, peace officers
training fee $15.00, court technology Fund fee $10.00, and emergency surcharge fee
$10.00).
There is no Infraction Rule for J.C. § 49-443. The bottom line for the Court is: What is the
intent or purpose of I.C. § 49-456(1 ); and hmv is the driving public to interpret such a statute?

C.
THE APPLICATION OF J.C.§§ 49-428, 49-443 and 49-456 ARE VAGUE
The State argues: "To be successful, Mr. I Iamilton must demonstrate that LC.§§ 49-428 and
49-443 are impermissibly vague in all of their applications." Respondent's Brief~ p. 11. The State
ignores the U.S. Supreme Court Case, Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 2560-61, 192
LEd.2D 569 (2015). Johnson was cited in the first brief filed by Mr. Hamilton but will be noted
again because the State failed to realize that this U.S. Supreme case trumps Idaho case law. The U.S.
Supreme noted in Johnson:
In all events, although statements in some of our opinions could be
read to suggest otherwise, our holdings squarely contradict the theory
that a vague provision is constitutional merely because there is some
conduct that clearly falls within the provision's grasp. For instance,
we have deemed a law prohibiting grocers from charging an "unjust
or unreasonable rate" void for vagueness even thought charging
someone a thousand dollars for a pound of sugar would surely be
unjust and unreasonable. L. Chen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. at 89, 41
S.CT. 298. We similarly have deemed void for vagueness a law
prohibiting people on sidewalks from '·conduct[ing] themselves in a
6

manner annoying to persons passing by" - even though spitting in
someone's face would surely be annoying. Coates v. Cincinnati, 402
U.S.611, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971). These decisions
refute any suggestions that the existence of some obviously risky
crimes establishes the residual clause's constitutionality.
Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 2560-61, 192 L.Ed.2D 569 (2015)

The State, in its brief, goes on to argue as follows:
"Mr. Hamilton also fails to advise the Court of a recent decision interpreting LC. §
49-808, ~where the Court of Appeals found that I.C. § 49-808 was not
unconstitutionally vague as applied, State v. Colvin, 151 Idaho 881, 341 P.3d 589
(Ct. App. 2014)."
Respondent's Brief, p. 12
This argument seems odd considering that Mr. Hamilton, in his initial brief specifically \vent
head on against the holding in Colvin. See Appellant's Brief: p. 25. The Court \Vould be right to be
suspect of the State's argument in Mr. Hamilton's case.
The State also indicates that somehow Mr. Hamilton failed to analyze the effect of State v.
A1artin, 148 Idaho 31,218 P.3d 10 (Ct. App. 2009). Responden t's Brief, p. 12. Mr. Hamilton's

Appellant's Brief docs address State v. Afar/in as the Afartin Court failed to apply LC. § 49-456(1)
in its decision.
The State also argues that Mr. Hamilton failed to preserve vagueness for judicial review by
failing to argue vagueness before the hearing otlicer. Mr. Hamilton already addressed this point in
his opening Appellant's Brief by noting the argument was made to the hearing offieer. The District
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thought that the issue \Vas properly before it

udicial

because

District

wrote a decision specifically addressing the issue. R., at p.106.
The State simply wants to ignore the record in this case regarding vagueness. The hearing
oflicer commented on LC. § 49-456. The District Court decided to ignore LC. § 49-456 in violation
of case law that instructs courts to look at all relevant statutes when trying to analyze the intent of
a statutory scheme. State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 439; 362 P.3d 514 (2015).
Due process requires that a driver be informed as to what the State commands or forbids and
that persons of ordinary intelligence not be forced to guess at the meaning of the law. As a result,
criminal statutes must plainly and unmistakably provide fair notice of what is prohibited and what
is allO\ved in language persons of ordinary intelligence will understand. In addition, a statute is void
for vagueness if it invites arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. See State v. Bitt, 118 ID 584,
798 P.2d 43 (1990) and State v. Cobb, 132, ID 195, 969 P.2d 244 (1198) In Hamilton, a person of
ordinary intelligence would believe that I.C. § 49-456(1) applies to what is unlawful \Vith regard to
registration issues because that is was the statute actually says.

What are the standards law

enforcement is to use to pull someone over when the registration sticker is not in the rectangle box?
The State ignores this portion of the argument regarding vagueness.
The photos of the other license plate clearly show the registration sticker not totally in the
rectangle box.

Would law enforcement have the right to pull this vehicle over because the

registration sticker was not totally in the rectangle box. How is one to know how far in, how far out,
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straight,

crooked the sticker has to

No one knows. Judge Schwartzman filed a

concurring opinion in State v. Dewbre, 133 Idaho 663,991 P.2d. 388 (Ct. App. 2010) in which he
wrote in a footnote:
[ 1] My empirical, but thoroughly unscientific, study on this observation was fully
vindicated on my trip North over Highway 55/95. With the possible exception of
myself, now fully cognizant of the impending oral argument in this case, I can attest
that no signals were given by the general travelling public within my line of vision,
excluding one slow-moving vehicle dutifr1lly moving to the right. Had I.S.P. Officer
Yount been with me, he could have had afield day handing out tickets for alleged
49-808 violations. (emphasis original)
The same can be said for Mr. Hamilton 's counsel's observation of the parking lot at the Idaho
Supreme Court building regarding placement ofregistra tion stickers on vehicles parked next to the
Idaho Supreme Court building. One will assume that the vehicles in said parking lot were driven
and O\Vned by individuals who worked in the Supreme Court Building.
The Court cannot ignore the application of LC. § 49-456(1) in the determination of the
vagueness challenge in this case. The Court cannot ignore the issue of how l,nv enforcement might
determine who they can stop for not having the registration sticker totally in the rectangle that has
been placed in the lower right hand corner of Idaho license plates. The statutory scheme found in
Chapter 4 of Title 49 is vague.
VI.

CONCLUSION
ISPFS has failed to follow the statutory mandate of LC. § 18-8002A and § 18-8004(4)
regarding "rule" making and thus the breath testing for Mr. Hamilton can not be used to suspend his
9

LC.§ 67-5279 mandates a reversal because this action of the agency was unconstit utional,
as beyond statutory authority and was arbitrary. Additionally, there was no legal cause to stop Mr.
Hamilton. The three statutes noted above when read together are vague. The Court must set aside
the hearing officer's decision and send the matter back to the Departme nt vvith instructions to set
aside the suspension.
DATED this

22nd

day of February, 2016.

I hereby certify on the 22nd
day of February 2016, a two (2) true
copies of the foregoing instnnnen t
was: XX
Mailed
Faxed
Hand delivered to:

Edwin L. Littencker
Special Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Departme nt
P.O. Box 321
Lewiston, ID 83501
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